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The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility
Abstract
A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm.  Our paper
investigates a potentially significant consequence of a CEO turnover: a change in equity
volatility.  We develop several hypotheses about how CEO changes might affect stock price
volatility, and test these hypotheses using a sample of 872 CEO changes over the 1979-1995
period.  We find that volatility increases following a CEO turnover, even for the most frequent
type, when a CEO leaves voluntarily and is replaced by someone from inside the firm.  Our
results indicate that forced turnovers, which are expected to result in large strategy changes,
increase volatility more than voluntary turnovers.  Outside successions, which are expected to
result in a successor CEO with less certain skill in managing the firm's operations, increase
volatility more than inside turnovers.  We also document a greater stock-price response to
earnings announcements around CEO turnover, consistent with more informative signals of
value driving the increased volatility.  Controls for firm-specific characteristics indicate that the
volatility changes cannot be entirely attributed to factors such as changes in firm operations, firm
size, and both volatility change and performance prior to the turnover.
1I.  Introduction
A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm.  A chief executive
officer’s ability, preferences, and ultimate decisions may affect the firm through the projects the
firm selects, its financial policy, or the corporate culture.  To the extent that these characteristics
and the resulting decisions differ across individuals, CEO changes can alter the course of the
firm and its performance.
Many studies have analyzed the short-run impact of CEO changes on shareholder wealth, and
the longer-term effects on firm operations.  In general, a CEO turnover is followed by positive
excess returns and restructuring of firm operations.  Furtado and Karan (1990) cite 10 studies
that estimate the announcement effect of CEO changes.  They find that abnormal returns around
the announcement are typically 25-50 basis points for all changes, and increase to 1% to 3% for
certain subsamples.  Denis and Denis (1995) find changes in operating performance, the level of
corporate control activity, and asset restructuring around turnover, especially forced departures.
Weisbach (1995) shows evidence that new CEOs often reverse the investment decisions of their
predecessors, a tendency that is independent of the cause of the predecessor’s departure.  Huson,
Malatesta, and Parrino (1999) document an increase in accounting performance subsequent to
CEO turnover, especially for turnovers associated with outside succession.
Our paper investigates another potentially significant consequence of a CEO turnover: a
change in equity-return volatility.  We analyze changes in stock-market volatility for turnovers in
general, and by departure type and source of the successor, for a sample of 872 CEO changes
over the 1979-1995 period.  We find a significant and long-lived volatility increase associated
with forced turnover.  Volatility increases are greater for forced than voluntary turnover, and
volatility increases are greater for outside than for insider succession.
We also analyze the stock-price response to information announcements around CEO
turnover using earnings response coefficients.  We find that stock-price sensitivity to the
unexpected component of quarterly earnings announcements increases following a turnover.
This result is consistent with our volatility findings, where part of the increased volatility may be
2due to signals of firm value that are more informative following turnover.
It is possible that the observed link between turnover and volatility might be due to other
firm-specific characteristics such as firm size or historical stock-price performance.  For
example, the poor performance that typically precedes the forced departure of a CEO is likely to
cause the firm to be smaller and more levered (all else equal) around forced departures,
characteristics which are associated with increased volatility (e.g., see Black 1976; Christie
1982; and Hawawini and Keim 1995).1  As we show below, we also find an increase in volatility
during the period prior to the announcement.  So, another alternative hypothesis is that we are
observing firms with increasing volatility that happened to experience CEO turnovers and that
we are mistakenly attributing the effect to the turnover event.
To test whether these firm-specific characteristics are driving our results, we construct two
matching samples of firms of similar size, one based on historical stock-return performance as of
the announcement date, and one based on the pre-event change in volatility.  We compare the
volatility changes of the turnover and matching-sample firms and find that CEO turnover type is
informative, even when the effects of size, historical performance, and pre-event changes are
taken into account.  We also analyze changes in company operating characteristics and find that
these changes do not fully explain the volatility differences that we observe across turnover
types.  We conclude that different turnover types, controlling for other factors, have different
effects on future volatility.
The volatility consequences of a turnover are important because a change in stock price
volatility may have a meaningful impact on the firm, its management, and its stakeholders.  A
change in volatility may affect a firm’s optimal capital structure, cost of capital, optimal
allocation of control rights, and may result in a wealth transfer between stockholders and
bondholders.  Higher stock-price volatility may magnify agency problems, complicate
implementation of pay-for-performance policies, and decrease the ability of the board to
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3determine a manager's ability using observed performance.  Increased volatility may also limit a
stock's attractiveness as a means of compensation or as a currency for acquisitions.  For example,
a recent popular press article cites high stock-market volatility as a rationale for Bertelsmann
rebuffing a merger attempt by AOL (Ewing 2000).  Another article describes an internet
company's (E-Loan's) inability to use its volatile shares to make acquisitions (Hof and Saveri
1999).  These effects imply that the expected volatility impact may be an important factor for the
board in planning a CEO succession strategy.
While economic significance is a matter of opinion, we believe the effects we estimate to be
economically meaningful.  For example, depending on the controls used, we find a volatility
increase for forced departures of approximately 16% to 25% for the year following the event.
This corresponds to six to 10 percentage points for an average forced-departure firm.  One
informal way to gauge significance would be to estimate the change in the value of an at-the-
money call option as a result of this volatility increase.  A one-year at the money call option on
our average forced-departure firm’s equity would increase in value by around 14% using the
conservative end of our predicted effects.2
At one end of the spectrum, an orderly succession from a retiring CEO to the firm's long-time
president or chief operating officer —  e.g., the "passing the baton" model of Vancil (1987) —
might be expected to add little uncertainty about the future prospects of the firm.  In such a case,
it seems likely that the market would expect the incoming CEO to continue to lead the firm in its
current direction.  Furthermore, there would likely be less uncertainty about the new CEO's
ability to manage the particular firm, ceteris paribus, because the new CEO was previously an
officer of the firm.
At the other end of the spectrum, the replacement of a fired CEO with an outsider might add
a significant amount of uncertainty about the future direction of the firm.  This type of turnover
might signal the board's desire for a drastic change in the firm's strategy.  The expected change in
                                                          
2 Specifically, this estimate relies on the Black-Scholes (1973) model, with no dividends, stock and strike prices of
$50, a risk-free rate of eight percent, a beginning volatility of 40% (roughly our sample average for firms with
forced departures) and change in volatility of 7 percentage points (using the coefficient estimates of Table 5).
4strategy, enacted by a leader without significant experience within the firm, could lead to a larger
increase in the uncertainty over the future success of the firm.  It is also possible that this type of
turnover might result in a decrease or unchanged level of volatility.  For example, a replacement
CEO with better skill in project selection might implement projects with higher expected returns
and lower risk than the projects of the outgoing CEO.  Thus, different types of CEO departure
(firing versus retirement) and succession (inside successor versus outside successor) may add
differing degrees of uncertainty about firm prospects.  This is consistent with our results; forced
departures and outside successions are associated with greater volatility increases.
We develop three hypotheses of CEO succession which lead to different predictions of
turnover's impact on volatility: the strategy hypothesis, the ability hypothesis, and the scapegoat
hypothesis.  These are designed to differentiate between the possible ways that the circumstances
surrounding the departure of the incumbent CEO, as well as the source of his or her successor,
affect the degree to which uncertainty (and volatility) increase following turnover.
The next section discusses the economic impact of an increase in volatility.  Section III
develops our hypotheses about volatility and CEO turnover.  Section IV discusses the data, and
Section V presents our empirical results.  Section VI concludes.
II. Economic impact of a volatility increase
The volatility impact of a CEO turnover is important for several reasons.  For example,
equity volatility has different costs for different stakeholders in the firm.  Volatility increases
may exacerbate conflicts between stockholders and bondholders, and may hinder resolution of
stockholder-management problems.  Furthermore, increased volatility may be a cost to the firm
due to increased costs of raising capital and less attractive medium for acquisitions or
compensation.  To the extent that these effects imply a marginal cost of increased volatility (or
possibly a marginal benefit), the expected volatility impact should also be a factor for the board
in planning a CEO succession strategy.
In general, increases in stock-price volatility are associated with a wealth transfer from
5bondholders to stockholders.  The Merton (1974) model provides strong predictions about
linkages between equity volatility and the value of debt and equity claims.  In this model, an
increase in equity volatility is associated with an increase in asset volatility.  Higher asset
volatility raises the probability that firm assets will not meet liabilities, resulting in default.
Thus, an increase in equity volatility decreases the value of the claims of bondholders.  Higher
equity volatility might also lead to a lower credit rating and a higher cost of future debt issuance.
In Merton’s model, equity is a call option on firm assets with an exercise price equal to the
face value of outstanding debt.  An increase in volatility results in greater upside potential and no
change in downside risk for equity claims, which increases their value.  Equity volatility
increases are also beneficial to holders of equity options.3
Increased volatility might also imply an increase in the required return to the firm’s equity.
Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) and Bhagat, Brickley, and Loewenstein (1987) argue that
“information risk” — undiversifiable risk associated with event-specific information
announcements — may be priced by the market.  When this type of risk increases, expected
returns will increase.  Using equity return standard deviation as a proxy for information risk,
these papers provide empirical evidence that expected returns increase after dividend
announcements and during tender offer periods.
Stakeholders might favor different types of turnover to take advantage of different volatility
impacts.  Previous theoretical work has typically made an assumption as to the effect of
managerial replacement on volatility, without the benefit of empirical evidence.  Which direction
the change is assumed to take can have important implications for the results of these models.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) analyze the relations between the financial structure of a firm, the
return streams of the firm’s securities, and the incentives to intervene in management.  Their
Assumption 1 (p. 1031) is that the riskiness in firm value is reduced following turnover.  This
assumption has important implications in their model.  For example, it implies that when
debtholders are in control, they will be “excessively tough” in replacing management following
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6poor performance.
In contrast, Berkovitch and Israel (1996) and Grinstein (2000) assume that volatility
increases following managerial replacement.  They show that when residual claimholders have
control rights, they are more likely to make changes that result in volatility increases.  In
Berkovitch and Israel (1996), when manager ability is unknown ex-ante, then for the firm to
commit to an optimal dismissal policy that involves firing above-average managers, it must give
control rights to the residual claimants.  However, if the optimal policy is to dismiss only below-
average managers, then the firm must give control rights to the fixed claimants.  Crucial to these
results is the assumption that replacing the manager increases the uncertainty of future cash
flows.  If replacing the manager leads to less volatility, then the optimal allocation of control
rights could be reversed.  In related work, Grinstein (2000) addresses the optimality of selling the
firm’s assets or replacing the manager in the event of poor performance.  Thus, the volatility
change subsequent to a CEO turnover has implications concerning the optimal capital structure
and the allocation of control rights.
  Increased stock-price volatility could also impact a firm’s ability to use its stock in
acquisitions, issue debt or equity, and use stock-market performance as a metric for managerial
performance.  Volatility changes also affect distortions arising from incentive problems – caused,
for example, by executives or employees holding undiversified portfolios.  If the firm’s
management and shareholder preferences over volatility differ, changes in volatility could
exacerbate agency problems.  If managerial ability is unknown but related to firm performance,
increased stock-price volatility would also reduce the board’s (or stockholders’) ability to revise
their beliefs about managerial talent or ability.  A model that captures both of these effects is
Gibbons and Murphy (1992).  In their model, managerial ability is unobservable, managers are
risk averse, and shareholders are risk neutral.  In this setting, increased noise or volatility in the
profitability signal would lead to less precise revisions of beliefs about managerial ability.  It
would also change the optimal managerial contract due to the risk aversion of the manager; a
manager would demand a higher expected wage, ceteris paribus, if his or her wealth were based
7on a noisier signal.  Similarly, Campbell and Kracaw (1987) argue for the benefit of hedging by
showing how a decrease in volatility leads to increased managerial effort in equilibrium.
To the extent that a turnover results in a (marginally) costly increase in volatility, the optimal
dismissal strategy of the board will be affected.  In this case, a turnover should only occur when
the prospective gains from turnover (e.g., better management skill) outweigh the costs (including
those from volatility).  High volatility costs might lead the board to choose a lower performance
threshold below which the manager would be the dismissed (e.g., Hartzell 1998).
III.  CEO turnover and firm performance
The CEO may have a major influence on investment decisions, financing decisions, and
operating policies of the firm.  A change in the CEO can represent a structural break in the
operations of the firm.  If the CEO’s decisions have a major effect on firm performance, we
would expect to potentially observe changes in the characteristics of the return series following a
turnover, including changes in the volatility.  There are two ways a new CEO can significantly
affect firm performance.  The first is through changes in the strategy of the firm (investment,
operations, and financial), and the second is through ability to implement the new strategy.  A
third possibility is that a change in CEO does not significantly affect firm performance.  This
may occur when alternative CEOs have similar abilities and implement analogous strategies.  In
this section, we discuss three theories of CEO replacement and explore their implications for
equity volatility changes around CEO turnover.
A.  Board decisions and the strategy hypothesis
The CEO makes decisions regarding the strategic direction of the firm.  In the event of a
turnover, the board of directors has discretion over the selection of the new CEO.  The board is
likely to choose a CEO they expect will implement a successful business strategy.  When the
current business strategy is performing well, it is reasonable to expect that the board will select a
successor CEO who will in turn be unlikely to significantly alter the firm’s strategy.  When the
current business strategy is performing poorly, the board is likely to choose a successor CEO
8with new plans for the firm.  This model of CEO selection focuses on the desire of the board to
maintain or change the strategy of the firm.
Regardless of the cause of CEO turnover (retirement or termination), the board can use the
opportunity to replace the CEO as a means of controlling the future direction of the firm.  If the
board wishes to keep the current strategy, they are likely to choose an inside successor.  An
inside successor is likely to have been “groomed” by the company, and may be expected to
continue to operate the company in a manner similar to that of the departing CEO.  Thus, under
the strategy hypothesis, we would not expect to see an increase in volatility following the
appointment of an insider as CEO.
Alternatively, the board may choose to replace the CEO with someone from outside the firm.
This occurs when there are no acceptable candidates within the firm, or when the board decides
the firm needs to move in another direction.  For example, Helmich and Brown (1972) find that
organizational change increases following outside succession.  As the firm changes its
underlying business strategy, uncertainty about the future plans of the firm may increase, leading
to increased stock-price volatility.  In contrast to inside succession, we would expect outside
succession to be associated with a volatility increase due to the uncertainty over the new strategy
of the firm.
The board of directors also makes decisions regarding the firing of the CEO, although a CEO
may voluntarily leave the firm at any time.  The retirement of the CEO is an example of a
voluntary turnover, i.e., one not initiated by the board.  Since this is not a decision of the board,
we would not expect the voluntary departure of the CEO to be correlated with the board’s desire
to move the firm in a new direction.  Thus, we would not expect voluntary departures to be
associated with an increase in volatility due to the board desire to change the firm’s strategy.
A forced turnover occurs when the board is dissatisfied with the existing CEO.  If the board
wishes to move the firm in a new direction and feels the current CEO cannot perform the task,
the board dismisses the CEO.  We should only observe forced turnover when the board is
dissatisfied with the results of the existing CEO.  Hence, forced turnover signals that the existing
9firm policies are inadequate, and that substantial changes are required.  We expect a firm to
change strategy and policies following a forced turnover, leading to a period of higher stock-
price volatility.
We refer to this line of reasoning as the strategy hypothesis.  The strategy hypothesis posits
that volatility increases after a turnover are the result of uncertainty about the nature of the
strategy that will be implemented by the new CEO.  The magnitude of the increase in volatility
should depend on how significantly the new strategy is expected to differ from the old strategy.
This volatility increase will diminish as the market learns about details of the plans, and their
likelihood of success or failure.  This hypothesis implies that voluntary departures followed by
an inside replacement will not result in a volatility change, while forced departures (especially
when followed by outside replacements) will result in a significant volatility increase.
B.  Learning models and the ability hypothesis
An alternative (though not mutually exclusive) model of CEO selection is based on unknown
CEO ability.  When the CEO departs, the board of directors chooses the best replacement CEO
based on expected ability.  In these models, the board of directors and investors learn about the
CEO’s ability over time after the CEO is hired.  For example, MacDonald (1982) shows that
learning may lead to changes in tasks, while Murphy (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
use learning models to address compensation issues.
Based on this model of CEO selection, a CEO turnover is expected to lead to increased
uncertainty about future firm performance and increased stock-price volatility as the market
learns about the ability of the new CEO.  The magnitude of the volatility increase should depend
on the level of uncertainty about the skills of the new CEO.  If the CEO is from inside the firm,
the market and board are likely to have a more precise initial evaluation of the CEO’s ability to
run the firm.  If the CEO is from outside the firm — especially if he or she is from outside the
industry — the market and board are likely to have a less precise estimate about initial ability,
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and the early signals of performance should be especially informative.  Hence, we expect to
observe higher volatility after a turnover with outside successions relative to inside successions.4
In a learning-model setting, the dismissal of an existing CEO occurs when the expected
ability of the current manager based on past performance drops below the expected ability of a
replacement CEO.  If there is a cost to change the CEO, the expected improvement of the new
CEO must outweigh the replacement cost for a dismissal to be optimal.5  The change in volatility
due to learning the new CEO’s ability will be based solely on the precision of beliefs about the
new CEO compared to the precision of beliefs about the departing CEO.  The type of departure
by the old CEO (voluntary or forced) should have no effect on the volatility change.6
We refer to this line of reasoning as the ability hypothesis.  The ability hypothesis predicts
that volatility increases after a turnover are due to investor uncertainty about the skill of the new
CEO in managing the existing operations of the firm.  Based on this prediction, we expect stock-
price volatility to increase following a turnover as the market learns the ability of the new CEO.
We expect this increase in volatility to be larger for outside successions, due to the limited
information about an outsider’s ability to run the company relative to an insider.  We would not
expect the type of departure (forced or voluntary) to affect the stock-price volatility under the
ability hypothesis.
C.  Agency models and the scapegoat hypothesis
The scapegoat hypothesis is based on the agency models of Holmstrom (1979), Shavell
(1979), and Mirrlees (1976).7  These models imply that a credible dismissal threat is necessary to
ensure optimal exertion of effort by the incumbent CEO.  In these models, all CEOs have equal
ability, and differences in firm performance are due to the level of effort exerted and chance.
                                                          
4 It is worth noting that it is very rare that a CEO leaves one firm to be CEO of another firm.  Thus, outside
replacements typically have track records based on their performance as a non-CEO executive, not as CEO of
another firm.
5 The exact firing rule would also depend on the model's assumptions about contract renegotiation.
6 We are assuming that the CEO has no advantage over the board in choosing a high-ability successor.  In other
words, a CEO leaving voluntarily who helps pick a successor from outside the firm does so with no more precision
than a board picking an outside successor following a forced departure.
7 Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (1999) develop the implications of this hypothesis (or lack thereof) on accounting
performance.  We extend the analysis to discuss the implications on stock price volatility.
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In equilibrium, the board of directors commits to a policy of manager dismissal after poor
firm performance.  This policy induces all managers to exert the optimal level of effort.
Dismissal occurs when there is poor performance due to chance, and a replacement manager
(with equal ability) is selected.  Since firing occurs due to random factors that result in poor firm
performance, rather than the ability or effort of the CEO, the CEO appears to be a “scapegoat.”
The scapegoat hypothesis implies that volatility is unaffected by a CEO turnover.  All
managers have the same ability and exert the same effort, so the characteristics of the firm
(including firm volatility) do not change after a turnover.  The type of succession and type of
departure convey no information about the future volatility of the firm.  Of course, this is an
extreme version of this hypothesis.  An alternative hypothesis, which is difficult to distinguish
empirically, is that the uncertainty over the new CEO's ability is very small.  For example,
screening mechanisms for selecting CEOs may be so developed that there is little difference in
uncertainty between the incumbent and new CEOs.
The volatility effects implied by the strategy hypothesis, ability hypothesis, and scapegoat
hypothesis are summarized below:
Type of Departure Type of Succession
Voluntary Forced Inside Outside
Strategy Hypothesis No change Increase No change Increase
Ability Hypothesis No change No change Increase Larger increase
Scapegoat Hypothesis No change No change No change No change
IV.  Data and descriptive statistics
Changes in top executives are identified using the Forbes executive compensation surveys
over the 1979-1995 period.  In order to qualify for the sample, both the departing and incoming
CEO must have appeared in the survey.  For each change, the announcement date is obtained
from the Wall Street Journal.
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Of particular interest is the nature of the change in management.  We classify each turnover
as either forced or voluntary, and each succession as inside or outside.  Forced departures are
those for which (1) the announcement says that the departing CEO was forced out or fired, or (2)
the departing CEO is under the age of 60 and does not leave for health reasons or to go to
another firm.  All other departures are voluntary.  Outside successions are those for which the
incoming CEO has been with the firm for less than one year, and all other successions are
classified as inside.8
Each turnover is matched with stock-price data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), and where available, accounting data from Compustat.  We collect returns for
each firm for two years before and four years after the announcement date.  We also collect each
firm’s total assets, net sales, and operating income for two fiscal years before and after the fiscal
year of the event.  These accounting data are converted into 1983 dollars.  Our proxy for the
market return is the CRSP value-weighted index.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
 Table 1 shows the distribution of turnovers by type and year for our sample of 872 events.
As the table shows, forced departures are fairly uncommon using our proxy, at about 17% of
both the full sample and Compustat subsample.  This frequency is similar to that found
previously; Mehran and Yermack (1996) find 15% of turnovers in their sample are forced, and
Denis and Denis (1995) find 13.6%.  Outside successions are slightly more common, at
approximately 21% of the events.  The events are well dispersed over time, with no year having
more than 10% of the total sample.9  Panel B presents the distribution of turnovers across the
four pairs of departure- and succession-types.  Voluntary departure followed by insider
succession is the most common event, comprising almost 72% of the sample.  The other three
                                                          
8 Subject to slightly different arbitrary cutoffs, these proxies for turnover types are similar to those used earlier in the
literature.  For examples of forced/voluntary turnover classification, see Weisbach (1988), Denis and Denis (1995),
Mehran and Yermack (1996), Parrino (1997), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), and Hartzell (1998).  Borokhovich,
Parrino, and Trapani (1996) use an identical definition of inside/outside succession.
9 The 1995 Forbes survey yields a small number of announcements in 1995, hence the small number of events for
that period.
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pairs – voluntary departure/outside succession, forced departure/inside succession, and forced
departure/outside succession – are almost equally common, at 11%, 8%, and 10% of the sample,
respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 details the summary statistics for the sample.  This table previews the findings of the
formal tests in the next section.  Pre-event (annualized) daily volatility for the two years prior to
a turnover averages 30.9% with a median of 27.7%.  These increase to 34.9% and 28.1%,
respectively, for the two years following a turnover.
Average volatility is higher prior to a forced turnover and increases by a larger amount after a
forced turnover.  For the forced-turnover subsample, pre-event mean (median) volatility is 39.6%
(35.2%), followed by 53.8% (36.3%) after the event.  To a lesser degree, outside successions are
also associated with higher volatility than the overall sample, with pre-event mean (median) of
39.5% (34.6%) and post-event mean (median) of 48.3% (34%).  Table 2 also shows that inside
successions are associated with larger firms, based on net sales, operating income, or total assets
as a proxy for firm size.  In addition, voluntary turnovers are associated with larger firm size,
using net sales or operating income as a proxy for size.  Voluntary turnovers are associated with
smaller firm size using total assets as a size proxy.  Furthermore, forced turnovers are associated
with slower asset growth following turnover.
Figure 1 graphically depicts changes in volatility for the entire sample, and by turnover type.
In constructing the figure, returns are separated into 24 event months before and 48 event months
after the announcement date, where each event month consists of 21 trading days.  We calculate
volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns for each event month.  In order to control for
the overall level of stock-market volatility, we then scale this firm-specific volatility by the
standard deviation of the market return over the same period.  For each event month, these ratios
are averaged across events.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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The figure is consistent with the summary statistics in Table 2.  Volatility is higher for the
full sample following turnover.  Volatility is also higher for the outside-succession and forced-
departure subsamples.  Forced departures experience the biggest increase on average, and the
announcement is preceded by an increase in volatility over the year prior to the event.
Interestingly, the increase in volatility after turnover appears to persist over several years
subsequent to the event.  While Table 2 and Figure 1 are consistent with volatility increasing
around turnover – especially for forced departures and outside successions – this evidence is
descriptive rather than rigorous.  The next section follows up with formal tests of the volatility
impact of different types of CEO turnover.
V.  Empirical tests
A.  Testing the strategy hypothesis, ability hypothesis, and scapegoat hypothesis
The scapegoat hypothesis predicts that CEO turnover will not affect volatility regardless of
type of departure and type of succession.  In contrast, the strategy and ability hypotheses predict
that volatility will increase following a turnover, and that the magnitude of the volatility increase
will depend on the turnover type.  The strategy hypothesis implies that forced departures and
outside successions will be followed by increases in volatility.  The learning hypothesis implies
that outside successions will lead to increased volatility, but that the type of departure does not
matter.  The strategy and ability hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and the evidence may
support both hypotheses.
We empirically test these hypotheses using several techniques that are described in detail in
the following sections.  Section B summarizes previous studies that analyze the impact of
corporate events on firm volatility.  Section C proposes and implements volatility regression tests
to measure the relationship between turnover type and volatility.  In Section D, we further
explore evidence for changes in the operating characteristics of the firm that would be associated
with the strategy hypothesis.  Section E presents an analysis of the return sensitivity to earnings
news before and after a turnover, suggesting a possible mechanism by which volatility would
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increase after a turnover event.  Section F presents evidence on competing hypotheses in an
effort to ensure that the volatility effects of different turnover types cannot be attributed to firm-
specific factors.
B.  Volatility event studies
A number of papers have considered the impact of corporate events on firm volatility.  For
example, Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bhagat, Brickley, and Loewenstein (1987) investigate
the volatility effect of cash tender offers.  Mandelker (1974) and Vijh (1994) report volatility
changes due to mergers and spinoffs.  Ohlson and Penman (1985) and Dubofsky (1991) analyze
the volatility impact of stock splits.  Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991), Hertzel and Jain (1991),
and Bartov (1991) estimate volatility changes around stock repurchases.  Kalay and Loewenstein
(1985) and Jayaraman and Shastri (1993) consider the volatility effect of dividend
announcements and increases.  Finally, Cornell (1978) discusses the effect of earnings
announcements on volatility, and Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988) analyze the effect of major
corporate announcements on volatility.
Several papers compare option implied volatilities before and after the event to measure the
volatility impact.  Mayhew (1995) reviews the literature related to these “implied volatility event
studies”; a subsequent related paper is Donders and Vorst (1996).  However, the majority of
papers perform a volatility event study based on a comparison of the variability of equity price
changes before and after the event to determine the volatility impact of the event.  For example,
Bhagat, Brickley, and Loewenstein (1987) compare pre-event and post-event standard deviations
using a t-test, Wilcoxon test, and Fisher sign test.  Ohlson and Penman (1985) compare the
proportion of post-event squared returns that exceed pre-event squared returns using Cochran’s
z-statistic.  Dubofsky (1991) uses a regression of log-ratios of pre-event and post-event variance
on explanatory variables.
C.  Volatility regression tests
In this section, we analyze volatility changes around turnover events using regression tests
similar to those of Dubofsky (1991).  We construct the log-ratio of post-event to pre-event
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standard deviations (the “volatility ratio”) as the dependent variable.  We construct independent
variables using indicators for the departure type (equal to one for forced, zero for voluntary) and
for succession type (equal to one for outside, zero for inside).  The regression coefficients of the
indicator variables measure the average volatility change due to the particular turnover or
succession type.  White (1980) robust standard errors are used to obtain the correct significance
levels and robust t-statistics for parameter estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity.
In order to mitigate announcement effects, and to test for persistence in volatility changes, we
use the volatility two years prior to the event as the base level and then compare this to the yearly
volatility for each of the four years after the turnover.  This also allows us to determine if there is
a significant volatility increase prior to the turnover as suggested by Figure 1.10  In order to
control for changes in market volatility over the same period, we calculate for each event the
volatility ratio for the CRSP value-weighted index over the identical sample window.
Columns two through six of Table 3 report the volatility regression results for the volatility
changes in the four years following the turnover relative to the base-period volatility.  When firm
returns are positively correlated with market returns, we expect to find a significant positive
correlation between firm and market volatility.  Our control for market volatility is highly
significant in each regression, with a p-value of less than 1%, which is consistent with our prior.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
More importantly, the intercept in all five regressions is statistically significant at the 5%
level implying that stock-price volatility increases after all turnovers, regardless of succession or
departure type.  This evidence is inconsistent with the scapegoat hypothesis, which predicts no
volatility change following a turnover, and is consistent with the ability hypothesis, which
predicts an increase in volatility due to increased uncertainty about the CEOs effectiveness.
Based on the intercept coefficient in column two, a routine turnover (voluntary departure
                                                          
10 Similar regressions were run for all tests using the year prior to the turnover as the base level volatility (i.e., the
denominator in our ratios), and the main findings of this paper are not affected by the choice of base level volatility
period.  Specifically, volatility is significantly higher following turnover, and the change in volatility is significantly
larger for forced departures.
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followed by an inside succession) is associated with a volatility increase of 4% in the first year
after the turnover.  The intercept is also significant in columns three through five, indicating that
the volatility increase persists for at least four years.  In addition, outside successions and forced
departures result in even larger volatility increases over one year and three years following
turnover, respectively.
The coefficients on the turnover-type indicator variables (the forced dummy) provide
evidence that supports the strategy hypothesis.  The regression results show that volatility is
24%, 22%, and 17% higher on average for forced turnovers compared to voluntary turnovers in
the three years after the turnover.  This volatility increase due to forced turnover is
approximately seven times the increase for non-forced turnover.  This result is not predicted by
the ability hypothesis, which asserts that there should be no difference in volatility based on
manner of departure.  This result is also inconsistent with the scapegoat hypothesis, under which
we would expect no change in volatility.
The lack of a volatility effect due to a forced turnover in the fourth year indicates that (on
average) the forced departure and resulting changes in CEO firm strategy do not have a
permanent effect on the riskiness of the firm’s returns to shareholders.  The temporary nature of
the volatility change is consistent with a market that is initially uncertain about the characteristics
of the firm’s new direction, and likelihood of success of the new strategy to be implemented by
the new CEO.  As the nature of the strategy is revealed through its implementation and the
success of the strategy is revealed through new results (e.g., reported sales or earnings), the
added uncertainty dissipates.
The coefficient on the succession-type indicator variable (the outside dummy) supports both
hypotheses.  The regression results show that an outside succession (relative to an inside
succession) leads to an average 9% increase in volatility in the year following the turnover.  The
succession type variable is not significant in years two or three (and is actually negative and
significant in year four), indicating that the volatility increase lasts about one year.  This
evidence is consistent with the implications of the ability hypothesis: there is a temporary
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increase in volatility associated with an outside succession — above that of an inside succession
— due to greater uncertainty about the skill of an outsider versus an insider in running the firm.
This result is also consistent with the strategy hypothesis, which posits that the board chooses
outside replacements when they want the firm to change strategy.  This uncertainty, however, is
notably less than that associated with forced departures, and of a much shorter duration.  The
finding of a volatility increase associated with an outside succession is inconsistent with the
scapegoat hypothesis.
These results suggest that the source of the successor CEO has comparatively less economic
significance than the circumstances of the incumbent’s departure.  In the year after a turnover,
forced departures increase volatility by approximately two-and-a-half times the increase
attributed to outside successions.  Furthermore, the change due to forced departure lasts about
three times as long as the change due to outside succession.
Alternative specifications (not reported here) lead to similar conclusions.  Specifically,
interactions of the forced and outside dummy variables are insignificant, indicating no
multiplicative effect between departure type and source of successor.  Also, when we add to the
base regressions a dummy variable equal to one for successor CEOs from outside the firm’s
industry, the coefficient on this outside-industry variable is insignificant and the base outside-
succession dummy variable retains its significant coefficient for the first year following turnover.
Thus, the fact that the replacement CEO is from outside the industry does not appear to add
uncertainty beyond the fact that he or she comes from outside the firm.
D.  The strategy hypothesis and the operating characteristics of the firm
To further analyze the strategy hypothesis, it is useful to examine evidence of significant
changes in firm operating characteristics after a forced turnover and outside succession, which
would be expected if the firm implemented a major strategy change.  For example, Denis and
Denis (1995) find evidence of large changes in operating characteristics and firm size around
forced turnover.  We also would expect to find little change in operating characteristics for
voluntary turnovers and inside succession.  Of course, it is possible that new CEOs make similar
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changes following voluntary departures compared to forced departures.  For example, Weisbach
(1995) finds that new CEOs are equally likely to reverse the investment decisions of their
predecessors following a forced departure as a voluntary one.
To proxy for changes in firm strategy and operating practices, we calculate five accounting-
based variables for the set of events for which Compustat data is available.  First, we calculate
the percentage change in total assets (net of inflation) from the fiscal year prior to the turnover (t-
1) to two fiscal years after the year of the turnover (t+2).11  By using the prior year as our base
year, we start with firm numbers prior to any large write-offs commonly associated with a
turnover (e.g., Murphy and Zimmerman 1993).  We also calculate the percent change in net sales
over the same interval, and the change in operating income, scaled by total assets at time t-1.  To
proxy for firm restructuring, we calculate the absolute value of the sum of extraordinary items
for the year of and year following turnover, scaled by total assets at time t-1.  We expect large
assets sales to also be associated with changes in structure and strategy; we proxy for this by
dividing the total cash from asset sales in years t and t+1 by total assets at time t-1.
Table 4 presents means of these variables by type of departure and succession.  As Panel A
shows, our sample seems to mirror the results found by Denis and Denis (1995).  Forced
turnovers are associated with significant decreases in total assets and net sales relative to all
turnovers, but are not associated with changes in operating income.  Forced departures are also
associated with greater extraordinary items and cash from asset sales relative to voluntary
departures.  Outside successions are associated with significantly lower changes in assets
compared to inside successions, but none of the other operating characteristics are significantly
different across succession types.  This is a univariate analysis, however.  As Table 1 shows,
many inside successions are also voluntary and Panel A does not separate the effects of departure
relative to those of succession.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
                                                          
11 The accounting data is collected for fiscal years, so it does not match the timing of our volatility calculations.  The
fiscal year of the turnover is considered year 0.  Year –1 is the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year containing the
turnover.  This overlaps with, but is not the same as, year –2 of the volatility calculations.
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In order to separate these effects, Panel B of Table 4 further subdivides the sample into
departure-type/succession-type pairs.  These results show that there are significant differences in
our proxies for operating changes for forced turnover compared to voluntary, independent of the
source of the successor (although the differences are largest for inside succession).  Inside and
outside successions have little differences in operating measures in either subsample, with the
exception of lower asset growth for outside successions following voluntary departures
compared to inside successions.
While these results are related to those of Weisbach (1995) and Huson, Malatesta, and
Parrino (1999), they are not directly comparable.  Weisbach tracks investment and divestiture
decisions around CEO turnover, while we only proxy for these decisions using Compustat data.
That said, we do find differences in firm size and restructuring activity across types of departure,
where he did not.  Huson et al. look for changes in operating performance following inside and
outside succession, and find that outside succession is associated with a greater improvement in
operating return on assets.  Our results are over a shorter window, and we track the change in
operating income scaled by beginning firm size rather than the change in scaled operating
income.  We are more interested in finding changes in strategy that might be associated with
changes in the level of income than changes in the quality of firm performance.
The results of this section document a relation between departure type and changes in
operating characteristics of the firm.  Consistent with the strategy hypothesis, forced departures
are associated with larger changes in firm operations than voluntary departures.  Outside
successions are associated with lower growth in assets, but not with any of the other proxies for
changes in operations.  These results are consistent with the volatility changes in the previous
section being due at least in part to changes in firm strategy.
E.  News and volatility: An earnings response analysis
The previous sections have documented significant increases in stock-price volatility
following CEO turnover.  In an efficient market, the volatility we observe should be associated
with new information being incorporated into prices.  Turnover could increase volatility in two
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ways: the volume of relevant firm-specific news could increase following turnover, or there
could be an increase in the importance of each news item.  For example, consider a firm-specific
news release of performance data (e.g., an earnings announcement).  For a given deviation from
expected value, such a release should be more informative for a new CEO compared to his or her
predecessor.  Whether the release provides information about the new CEO’s ability or the
viability of his or her strategy, the market is likely to have less precise prior beliefs about the
new CEO (i.e., ability or strategy) and therefore should place greater weight on the
announcement or signal.  Thus, for a given announcement, one would expect to see a greater
stock-price reaction for a new CEO compared to the incumbent prior to departure.
Systematically measuring the stock-price response to all firm-specific information is
impossible, so we concentrate on quarterly earnings announcements, which are frequent firm-
level announcements with measurable ex ante expectations.  This approach allows us to test for
differences in the magnitude of response to new information before and after CEO turnover.
Given the evidence on increased volatility following turnover, our hypothesis is that we should
observe greater stock-price response to information in general and earnings announcements in
particular following CEO turnover.
We use the standard earnings-response-coefficient methodology to analyze the importance of
unexpected earnings news on returns.  There is an extensive literature on earnings response, but
the most applicable study to our hypothesis is Chambers, Freeman, and Koch (1999).12  They
find a positive, cross-sectional relationship between volatility (or total risk) and earnings
response coefficients.  Our results complement theirs by analyzing the change in the
informativeness of earnings around an event associated with higher volatility, CEO turnover.
To implement our test, we calculate quarterly cumulative abnormal returns as the sum of
abnormal daily firm returns relative to the CRSP beta-matched portfolios, where quarters begin
three days after the previous quarter’s earnings announcement and end two days after the current
                                                          
12 Please see their paper for a more extensive discussion of the earnings response literature and methodology.
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announcement.13  Unexpected earnings are the difference between actual earnings and the
median analyst’s forecast, normalized by the closing stock price two days after the previous
quarter’s earnings announcement.  Actual earnings, earnings estimates, and announcement dates
are from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S).  To test for changes in earnings
response around turnover, we then run the following regression:
CARit = γ 0 + UEit Σ4y=-2 δyYeary + γ 1UEit*|UEit|. (1)
In this regression, CARit is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i during quarter t, UEit is the
unexpected earnings for firm i over quarter t (actual earnings less the median forecast), and Yeary
equals one if quarter t is in (event) year y relative to the turnover.  We include an interaction
term, UEit*|UEit|, as a control for nonlinearity in earnings response (Freeman and Tse 1992; Das
and Lev 1994).
Consistent with our above volatility tests, we include data from two years (eight quarters)
before the turnover until four years (16 quarters) after the turnover, and exclude the quarter that
includes the turnover announcement.  The δy coefficients represent the earnings response
coefficients (ERCs) for years –2 through +4.  Our hypothesis of an increased stock-price
response around turnover predicts an increase in δy for the years following CEO turnover.
Our estimated regression is as follows
CARit = -0.011 + UEit (0.162 Yeart-2 + 0.251 Yeart-1 + 0.232 Yeart+1 + 0.200 Yeart+2
+ 0.200 Yeart+3 + 0.128 Yeart+4 – 0.033 UEit*|UEit| (2)
All of the coefficients are significant at the 1% level.14  More importantly, the ERCs increase
around turnover, from 0.16 two years prior to the event to from 0.25 to 0.20 over the t-1 to t+3
period.  Using an F-test, the coefficients for years t-1 to t+3 are significantly different from the
coefficient for year t-2, at significance levels of 1% for t-1, and 10% for the remaining three
years.  Similarly, the joint hypothesis that the coefficients for years t-1 through t+3 equal that of
year t-2 can be rejected at the 1% level.
                                                          
13 Daily abnormal returns using CRSP standard-deviation-matched portfolios produce very similar results.
14 The regression has an R2 of 0.02 with 9,075 observations.
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These results are consistent with our hypothesis; announcements are more informative (i.e.,
have a more positive relation with returns) around CEO turnover.  This is also consistent with
our finding of higher volatility during these periods, and the findings of Chambers, Freeman, and
Koch (1999).  Unlike our volatility results, earnings response is highest for the year prior to
turnover (although the coefficient for year t-1 is not significantly greater than the coefficient for
year t+1).  Consistent with our volatility results, the increased response lasts for three years after
the turnover.
F.  Tests of competing hypotheses
Given the strong linkage that we find between turnover type and volatility, we are interested
in investigating whether this result may be attributed to firm-specific characteristics such as firm
size, historical performance, or operating characteristics.  For example, a forced turnover is
associated with poor performance prior to the turnover event.  Thus, the volatility increase
following a forced turnover might be due to poor performance, rather than the turnover itself.15
Another alternative hypothesis is suggested by Figure 1, which shows an increase in volatility
prior to the event.  It is possible that our sample consists of firms experiencing increases in
uncertainty and volatility that also had changes in their CEOs.  In other words, we might be
mistakenly attributing the observed volatility pattern to an endogenous turnover event.
To test our results against these alternatives, we construct two matching samples.  By doing
so, we control for firm-specific factors including pre-event stock-price performance, pre-event
changes in volatility, and firm size.  Our first matched sample consists of firms with similar size
and return history prior to the turnover event.  In the spirit of Barber and Lyon (1996), for each
turnover event, we select the firm within the same NYSE size decile with the closest two-year
compounded return as of the announcement date.  If the matching firm is in our sample, we
select the next-best match.  Our second matched sample consists of firms with similar size and
pre-event changes in volatility.  For this sample, for each turnover event, we select the firm
                                                          
15 The volatility increase and the turnover could be jointly caused by other unobservable factors.  We construct two
matching samples using three variables (historical stock price performance and volatility change, and firm size) to
proxy for factors that the existing literature and sample characteristics indicates might be the strongest.
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within the same NYSE size decile with the closest change in volatility from two years prior to
the event to the year prior to the event.  Specifically, we match on the natural logarithm of the
ratio of the sample standard deviation for year –1 in event time to the sample standard deviation
for year –2 (where years consist of 250 trading days).  This is our dependent variable in column
one of Table 3.  We then use these two matching samples as controls to determine whether pre-
event size, performance, and volatility changes explain the post-event volatility increases
documented above.  This is also related to the approach of Bollen (1998), in which a matched
sample is constructed using non-event firms matched by industry group.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 graphs the monthly volatility of the turnover firms and the performance-based
matched-sample firms, in event time, before and after the turnover event.  As in Figure 1, returns
are separated into 24 event months before and 48 event months after the announcement date and
we calculate volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns for each event month.  As we are
most interested in the changes in volatility, we construct the ratio of each month’s average
volatility to the average volatility of 24 months prior to the event.  Thus, a number of 2 for a
given month implies that the average volatility is twice as high as the base month two years prior
to the event.  For each event month, these ratios are calculated for all turnover firms and all
matched-sample firms, respectively.
As the figure shows, turnover firms have bigger increases than similarly-performing firms
prior to the event.  This gap persists for roughly two years following the event.  The increase in
volatility of the forced-turnover firms after the event relative to the performance-matched firms
is especially strong.  Overall, it is clear that the performance-matched firms have volatility
increases, but these increases are smaller than for turnover-sample firms.  We take this as
evidence that more than returns and firm size our driving our results.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 shows identically-constructed graphs, but where the match is based on pre-event
volatility changes (hereafter, the volatility-matched sample).  As the graphs show, the match
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procedure does a good job of selecting firms with similar run-ups in volatility prior to the event
date, until a couple of months prior to the event.  Then, the turnover firms increase at a greater
rate than the matching firms, and this gap lasts until about two years after the event.  As in
Figure 1, the evidence is particularly strong for forced-turnover firms.
To more rigorously analyze this question, we directly test whether the sample of turnover
firms experiences increased volatility, controlling for the changes of both groups of matching-
sample firms.  We conduct the same tests as those of Table 3, but we include the corresponding
volatility ratios for both matching samples as explanatory variables.  The percentage change in
volatility for each matching firm is calculated in an identical way, the same event windows (i.e.,
trading days) are used, and the market-volatility control variable is still included.  If our
matching characteristics explain our previous results, then these regressions should show
insignificant coefficients for the intercept, and turnover and succession indicator variables.  For
example, if pre-event volatility changes were completely driving our results, one would expect to
find a coefficient of one on the volatility-matched volatility ratio, with coefficients of zero for the
other variables.  As Table 5 shows, this is basically the case for the volatility ratio for the year
prior to the event (the basis for our match), but not after the turnover.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Columns two through four of Table 5 show that volatility is significantly higher for three
years following turnover, even when controlling for pre-event volatility changes and
performance.  This is evidenced by significant intercept terms in each of these columns.  Further,
forced departures have a significant marginal effect, ranging from a 17% increase in the year
after departure to 10.7% in the third year after the event.  Thus, our observed results are more
than just unobservable firm activities leading to both a persistent (pre-event) run-up in volatility
and CEO turnover.  These controls do absorb the outside-succession effect of Table 3.  So, while
we find that volatility increases overall, and by even more following forced departures, outside
successions have no marginally significant impact controlling for the matching characteristics.
Interestingly, the volatility-matched firms appear to act as more of a control than do the
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performance-matched firms.  The performance-matched firms’ coefficient is only significant at
the 5% level for the year following the event, while the volatility-matched firms’ coefficients are
significant at the 1% level every year.
One methodological concern is the use of estimated volatility ratios on the right-hand side of
our regressions in Table 5.  As estimates of the true (unobserved) volatility changes, they may be
subject to an errors-in-variables problem.  As a robustness test for this possibility, we compute
empirical standard errors for each regression in Table 5 using a 1,000-iteration bootstrap
procedure.  These results are nearly identical to those presented above (and as such are not
presented).16  In fact, the only change in significance level due to the use of bootstrapped errors
is for the performance-matched volatility ratio in column four, which is no longer significant at
the 10% level.
The results of Table 4 on the relation between operating variables (proxying for strategy
changes) and volatility raise the question of whether the volatility change after a turnover is due
to turnover type or if it can be explained entirely by changes in the operating variables.  Table 6
extends the regression analysis of Table 3 by measuring volatility changes while controlling for
changes in company fundamentals before and after turnover events for subset of firms for which
we have data from Compustat.17  Using a set of variables from Table 4, we add the percentage
changes in assets and sales, and the change in scaled operating income to the regressions of
Table 3.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
We present the augmented volatility regression results for three years following the turnover.
After controlling for the changes in operating characteristics, we find that the source of the
successor (inside or outside) no longer affects volatility.  However, forced departures still cause a
significant increase in volatility of 16% in year one and 9% in year two.  Furthermore, the
                                                          
16 The presented standard errors are the robust standard errors calculated according to White (1980).
17 Due to incomplete Compustat coverage, the sample size in the Table 7 regressions is reduced from 872 to 703
events.  Including the other two restructuring proxies (extraordinary items and cash from asset sales) reduces our
sample again by roughly half, so we exclude those two variables from Table 7.
27
regression intercept is positive and significant in the three regressions.  This indicates that a
turnover event is associated with average increase in volatility of 4%, 5%, and 3% for the
following three years, after controlling for changes in operating characteristics of the firm.  Thus,
changes in firm size or other operating characteristics do not eliminate the importance of
turnover (especially forced departures) on volatility.18
Columns four through six report the association between changes in operating characteristics
and volatility.  For example, column four shows that decreases in total assets (shrinkage of the
firm) is associated with increased volatility in the two years following the turnover.  Columns
five and six indicate that changes in operating income and net sales have a weaker association
with changes in volatility.
Overall these tests of competing hypotheses indicate that while there is some evidence that
firm size and pre-event performance are related to volatility changes following turnover, these
variables only explain a small fraction of the observed total increase in volatility.  In addition,
their ability to explain this fraction is limited to non-forced turnovers.  Forced turnovers are
associated with an increase in stock-market volatility, controlling for changes in operating
characteristics, market volatility, firm size, pre-event changes in volatility, and pre-event
performance.
VI.  Conclusion
A change in firm leadership signals the possibility of a change in firm strategy.  The
uncertain nature and prospects of a new strategy may lead to increased uncertainty about the
firm’s future cash flows.  In addition, a change in leadership results in uncertainty about the
ability of the new CEO.  As the market evaluates the characteristics of the new CEO’s strategy
and ability, market expectations about firm value may be revised more frequently or dramatically
than in the past.  These factors suggest that the stock-price volatility may increase following a
                                                          
18 Many of the dropped observations due to unavailable Compustat data are associated with high changes in
volatility.  Thus, the drop in magnitudes and significance of forced turnover and outside succession from Tables 4 to
7 are attributable to both the inclusion of operating variables and the excluded observations.
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CEO turnover.  Such a volatility change might affect many stakeholders of the firm, due to
changes in the likelihood of distress, the degree of information asymmetry, or the impact of
agency problems.
One can segment CEO turnovers by the reason for the departure of the incumbent, and the
source of the successor.  We explore the different possible volatility effects of departure and
succession type through what we term the strategy hypothesis, the ability hypothesis, and the
scapegoat hypothesis.  The strategy hypothesis holds that forced turnovers and outside
succession will lead to greater volatility increases, while the ability hypothesis holds that
turnovers with outside succession will lead to greater volatility increases than inside successions
but predicts no differences in volatility change due to the type of departure.  Alternatively, the
scapegoat hypothesis predicts that CEO turnover will not change volatility.
We test these hypotheses using a sample of 872 turnovers in large firms from 1979 through
1995.  In our most basic specification, we find an increase in annualized stock return volatility
around turnover of roughly 3% for the four years subsequent to the turnover.  In the three years
following a forced departure, there is an additional volatility increase of approximately 20%.
The source of the new CEO is also important; in the first year following an outside succession
volatility increases by roughly an additional 9%.  We believe that these results are economically
significant, and are consistent with both the strategy and ability hypotheses but broadly
inconsistent with the scapegoat hypothesis.  The fact that forced turnover leads to higher
volatility is consistent with the strategy hypothesis but would not be expected under the two
alternative hypotheses.  The results on outside versus inside succession are consistent with both
the strategy and ability hypotheses and inconsistent with the scapegoat hypothesis.
An alternative explanation for these results is that changes in firm size, operating
performance, or market volatility, as well as pre-event firm size, performance, and volatility
changes are the factors that drive increases in volatility.  For example, the increase in volatility
and CEO turnover may be jointly caused by poor performance or perhaps an unobserved factor.
We directly control for firm size, operating performance, and market volatility in our tests, and
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through the use of matching samples we control for pre-event firm size, volatility change and
performance.  Given these controls, the overall effect for outside successions is insignificant, but
forced turnovers are still associated with significant increases in volatility, as are turnovers in
general.  Our matching sample results indicate that firm size, pre-event performance, and pre-
event volatility run-ups explain only a fraction of the forced-turnover volatility change.  Further,
alternative explanations cannot explain the persistence of the volatility increase after a forced
turnover.
Our tests provide new evidence on the importance of CEOs.  While previous studies have
shown small shareholder-wealth changes around the announcement of a turnover, followed by
changes in operations, we document a significant change in the volatility of the stock-price
process around a change in firm leadership.  The volatility changes that follow a CEO turnover
may have a significant impact on the firm, and the board may plan a succession strategy taking
these effects into account.
30
References
Barber, B.M., and J.D. Lyon, 1996.  Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical
power and specification of test statistics.  Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359-399.
Bartov, E., 1991.  Open-market stock repurchases as signals of earnings and risk changes.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 275-294.
Berkovitch E., and R. Israel, 1996.  The design of internal control and capital structure.  Review
of Financial Studies 9, 209-240.
Bhagat, S., Brickley, J., Loewenstein, U., 1987.  The pricing effect of interfirm cash tender
offers.  Journal of Finance 42, 965-986.
Black, F., 1976. Studies in Stock Price Volatility Changes, Proceedings of the 1976 Business
Meeting of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, American Statistical Association,
177 - 181.
Black, F. and M. Scholes, 1973, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, Journal of
Political Economy 81, 637-654.
Bollen, N., 1998.  A note on the impact of options on stock return volatility.  Journal of Banking
and Finance 22, 1181-1191.
Borokhovich, K.A., R. Parrino, and T. Trapani, 1996.  Outside directors and CEO selection.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 337-355.
Brown, K., Harlow, W., and S. Tinic, 1988.  Risk aversion, uncertain information, and market
efficiency.  Journal of Financial Economics 22, 355-386.
Campbell, T.S., and W.A. Kracaw, 1987.  Optimal managerial incentive contracts and the value
of corporate insurance.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22, 315-328.
Chambers, D.J., R.N. Freeman, and A.S. Koch, 1999.  The role of risk in price-earnings
relations.  Unpublished Manuscript.
Christie, A.A., 1982.  The Stochastic Behavior of Common Stock Variances: Value, Leverage
and Interest Rate Effects.  Journal of Financial Economics 10, 407-432.
Cornell, B., 1978.  Using the options pricing model to measure the uncertainty producing effect
of major announcements.  Financial Management 7, 54-59.
Coughlan, A.T., and R.M. Schmidt, 1985.  Executive compensation, management turnover and
firm performance.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 43-66.
Dann, L., Masulis, R., and D. Mayers, 1991.  Repurchase tender offers and earnings information.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 217-252.
31
Das, S., and B. Lev, 1994.  Nonlinearity in the returns-earnings relation: Tests of alternative
specifications and explanations.  Contemporary Accounting Research Fall, 353-379.
Denis, D.J., and D.K. Denis, 1995.  Performance changes following top management dismissals.
Journal of Finance 50, 1029-1057.
Denis, D.J., D.K. Denis, and A. Sarin, 1997.  Ownership structure and top executive turnover.
Journal of Financial Economics 45, 193-221.
Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole, 1994.  A theory of debt and equity: Diversity of securities and
manager-shareholder congruence.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1027-1054.
Dodd, P., and R. Ruback, 1977.  Tender offers and stockholder returns.  Journal of Financial
Economics 5, 351-373.
Donders, M.W.M., and T.C.F. Vorst, 1996.  The impact of firm specific news on implied
volatilities.  Journal of Banking And Finance 20, 1447-1461.
Dubofsky, D., 1991.  Volatility increases subsequent to NYSE and AMEX stock splits.  Journal
of Finance 46, 421-431.
Ewing, J., 2000. Can Bertelsmann Take Wing?  Business Week February 7.
Freeman, R.N., and S.Y. Tse, 1992.  A nonlinear model of security price response to unexpected
earnings.  Journal of Accounting Research 30(2), 185-209.
Furtado, E.P.H., and V. Karan, 1990.  Causes, consequences, and shareholder wealth effects of
management turnover: A review of the empirical evidence.  Financial Management 19, 60-
75.
Gibbons, R., and K.J. Murphy, 1992.  Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career
concerns: Theory and evidence.  Journal of Political Economy 100, 468-505.
Grinstein, Y., 2000.  The design of leveraged buyout transactions: Theory and tests.
Unpublished manuscript.
Hartzell, J.C., 1998.  The impact of the likelihood of turnover on executive compensation.
Unpublished Manuscript.
Hawawini, G., and D.B. Keim, 1995.  On the predictability of common stock returns, in: R.A.
Jarrow, V. Maksimovic, and W.T. Ziemba, eds., Handbook of Operations Research and
Management Science (Elsevier, New York) 497-544.
Hertzel, M., and P. Jain, 1991.  Earnings and risk changes around stock repurchase tender offers.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 253-275.
Helmich, D.L. and W.B. Brown, 1972.  Successor type and organizational change in the
corporate enterprise.  Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 371-381.
32
Hof, R.D., and G. Saveri, 1999.  Inside an internet IPO, Business Week September 6.
Holmstrom, B., 1979.  Moral hazard and observability.  The Bell Journal of Economics 10, 79-
91.
Huson, M.R., P.H. Malatesta, and R. Parrino, 1999.  Managerial succession and firm
performance.  Unpublished manuscript.
Jayaraman, N., and K. Shastri, 1993.  The effects of the announcements of dividend increases on
stock volatility: The evidence from the options market.  Journal of Business Accounting and
Finance 20, 673-685.
Kalay, A., and U. Loewenstein, 1985.  Predictable events and excess returns: The case of
dividend announcements.  Journal of Financial Economics 14, 423-449.
MacDonald, G.M., 1982.  A market equilibrium theory of job assignment and sequential
accumulation of information.  American Economic Review 72, 1038-1055.
Mandelker, G., 1974.  Risk and return: The case of merging firms.  Journal of Financial
Economics 14, 237-250.
Mayhew, S., 1995.  Implied volatility.  Financial Analysts Journal July-August, 8-20.
Mehran, H., and D. Yermack, 1996.  Stock-based compensation and top management turnover.
Unpublished manuscript.
Merton, R., 1974.  On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates.  Journal
of Finance 29, 449-470.
Mirrlees, J.A., 1976.  The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization.
The Bell Journal of Economics 7, 105-131.
Murphy, K.J., 1986.  Incentives, learning, and compensation: A theoretical and empirical
investigation of managerial labor contracts.  Rand Journal of Economics 17, 59-76.
Murphy, K.J., and J.L. Zimmerman, 1993.  Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 273-315.
Ohlson, J.A., and S.H. Penman, 1985.  Volatility increases subsequent to stock splits: An
empirical aberration.  Journal of Financial Economics 14, 251-266.
Parrino, R., 1997.  CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis.  Journal of
Financial Economics 46, 165-197.
Shavell, S., 1979.  Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship.  The Bell
Journal of Economics 10, 55-73.
Vancil, R.F., 1987.  Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession.  Harvard
Business School Press, Cambridge, Mass.
33
Vijh, A., 1994.  The spinoff and merger ex-date effects.  Journal of Finance 49, 581-609.
Warner, J., R.L. Watts, and K.H. Wruck, 1988.  Stock prices and top management changes.
Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492.
Weisbach, M.S., 1988.  Outside directors and CEO turnover.  Journal of Financial Economics
20, 431-460.
Weisbach, M.S., 1995.  CEO turnover and the firm’s investment decisions.  Journal of Financial
Economics 37, 159-188.
White, H., 1980.  A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix and a direct test for
heteroskedasticity.  Econometrica 48, 817-838.
Fig. 1: Mean ratios of firm volatility to market volatility around CEO turnover.  Volatility is  calculated as the sample daily standard 
deviation of returns. Means are calculated by averaging across events by month. Forced turnovers are defined as those turnovers for which 
the WSJ announcement indicates the CEO was forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not leave for 
health reasons or to go to another firm. An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO where the new CEO has been with the firm 
for less than one year at the date of the announcement.  The CRSP value-weighted index is the market proxy.
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Fig. 2: Ratio of mean month t volatility to month -24 volatility around CEO turnover for turnover and matching-
sample firms, with match based on pre-event returns. For each turnover-sample firm, a matching firm is selected from 
the same size decile, with the closest 2-year return as of the announcement date. Volatility is calculated as the sample daily 
standard deviation of returns.  Means are calculated by averaging across events by month. The ratio of each month's 
volatility to event month -24 volatility is then computed.  Forced turnovers are defined as those turnovers for which the WSJ 
announcement indicates the CEO was forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not leave 
for health reasons or to go to another firm. An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO where the new CEO has 
been with the firm for less than one year at the date of the announcement.  The CRSP value-weighted index is the market 
proxy.
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Fig. 3: Ratio of mean month t volatility to month -24 volatility around CEO turnover for turnover and matching-sample firms, 
with match based on pre-event change in volatility. For each turnover-sample firm, a matching firm is selected from the same size 
decile, with the closest change in volatility as of the announcement date. The change in volatility for matching purposes is calculated 
as the natural logarithm of the ratio of volatility for event year t -1 to that of t -2.  Volatility is calculated as the sample daily standard 
deviation of returns.  Means are calculated by averaging across events by month. The ratio of each month's volatility to event month -
24 volatility is then computed.  Forced turnovers are defined as those turnovers for which the WSJ announcement indicates the CEO 
was forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not leave for health reasons or to go to another firm. An 
outside succession is defined as a change in CEO where the new CEO has been with the firm for less than one year at the date of the 
announcement.  The CRSP value-weighted index is the market proxy.
Panel A: Turnovers by Year
Total Outside
Year Turnovers Forced Successions
1979 50 5 9
1980 54 8 8
1981 49 8 4
1982 43 4 2
1983 58 2 4
1984 51 12 9
1985 57 11 15
1986 50 4 5
1987 64 12 13
1988 78 15 20
1989 52 10 15
1990 55 17 18
1991 49 14 15
1992 37 10 10
1993 59 12 19
1994 53 6 10
1995 13 2 4
Total 872 152 180
Panel B: Turnovers by Departure/Succession Pair
Number of Percent of 
Observations Total
Forced Departure / Outside Succession 85 9.7%
Forced Departure / Inside Succession 67 7.7%
Voluntary Departure / Outside Succession 95 10.9%
Voluntary Departure / Inside Succession 625 71.7%
Table 1
Distribution of Turnovers by Type
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of CEO turnovers.  Forced turnovers 
are defined as those turnovers for which the WSJ announcement indicates the CEO was 
forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not leave for health 
reasons or to go to another firm.  An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO 
where the new CEO has been with the firm for less than one year at the date of the 
announcement. 
Standard
Variable Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum
Pre-Turnover Standard Deviation of Firm Returns (Annualized) [t-500 days, t-1 day]
     Full Sample 30.9% 27.7% 13.8% 7.4% 156.4%
     Forced Turnover 39.6% 35.2% 17.3% 13.1% 117.0%
     Outside Succession 39.5% 34.6% 20.4% 7.4% 156.4%
Post-Turnover Standard Deviation of Firm Returns (Annualized) [t+1 day, t+500 days]
     Full Sample 34.9% 28.1% 30.9% 9.7% 431.4%
     Forced Turnover 53.8% 36.3% 45.8% 15.1% 307.3%
     Outside Succession 48.3% 34.0% 43.9% 10.2% 342.8%
Total Assets  Year t -1 ($MM)
     Full Sample 9,210.50    2,995.52  20,568.00  135.17      184,325.50  
     Forced Turnover 9,458.90    3,523.43  20,337.00  135.17      184,325.50  
     Outside Succession 8,312.87    3,800.93  14,969.80  178.94      124,315.00  
Total Assets  Year t+2  ($MM)
     Full Sample 11,401.26  3,587.89  26,193.00  4.45          243,283.00  
     Forced Turnover 9,671.73    4,024.89  22,628.00  4.45          198,598.70  
     Outside Succession 8,864.57    4,238.46  19,313.47  4.45          180,978.00  
Operating Income Before Depreciation  Year t -1 ($MM)
     Full Sample 852.82       282.62     1,970.00    (840.00)    20,443.90    
     Forced Turnover 704.03       155.79     1,993.00    (459.42)    12,627.00    
     Outside Succession 616.79       175.75     1,612.84    (459.42)    12,627.00    
Operating Income Before Depreciation  Year t+2  ($MM)
     Full Sample 1,058.20    341.47     2,367.00    (1,478.00) 27,824.00    
     Forced Turnover 961.11       195.45     2,929.00    (41.00)      21,564.60    
     Outside Succession 814.08       241.15     2,022.04    (41.00)      13,874.00    
Net Sales  Year t -1 ($MM)
     Full Sample 5,658.89    2,252.58  12,277.00  98.39        124,993.90  
     Forced Turnover 5,305.44    2,082.00  14,037.00  114.30      122,081.40  
     Outside Succession 3,634.97    1,784.74  6,841.69    98.39        64,523.00    
Net Sales  Year t+2  ($MM)
     Full Sample 6,747.34    2,541.54  14,223.00  0.07          152,172.00  
     Forced Turnover 6,182.56    2,174.03  17,732.00  1.07          152,172.00  
     Outside Succession 4,213.32    1,978.41  8,618.28    0.07          71,940.00    
Table 2
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of CEO turnovers.  Each statistic is shown 
for the entire sample, forced turnovers only, and outside successions only.  Forced turnovers are 
defined as those turnovers for which the WSJ announcement indicates the CEO was forced out or 
fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not leave for health reasons or to go to 
another firm.  An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO where the new CEO has been 
with the firm for less than one year at the date of the announcement.  Standard deviations are 
annualized by multiplying the daily volatility by the square root of 250, and are presented for two 
event years before and after the turnover, where an event year is defined as 250 trading days.  
Accounting variables are presented for the fiscal year prior to the turnover (t -1) and for two fiscal 
years after the year of the turnover (t +2).  Accounting variables are available for 703 of the 872 
events.
Volatility event period year t -1 year t+ 1 year t+2 year t+3 year t+4
Base period year t -2 year t -2 year t -2 year t -2 year t -2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.0191 ** 0.0396 *** 0.0409 *** 0.0311 ** 0.0335 **
(2.11) (3.39) (2.84) (2.19) (2.37)
Dummy=1 for Forced 0.1591 *** 0.2424 *** 0.2168 *** 0.1668 *** 0.0938
     Turnovers (4.95) (5.03) (3.64) (3.03) (1.50)
Dummy=1 for Outside 0.0679 ** 0.0910 ** 0.0108 -0.0098 -0.0902 *
     Succession (2.15) (2.24) (0.23) (-0.21) (-1.80)
Ln(Ratio of Post- to Pre-Event 0.5065 *** 0.5110 *** 0.4296 *** 0.3467 *** 0.3954 ***
     Market Volatility) (22.11) (17.72) (12.01) (10.42) (13.70)
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.320 0.162 0.141 0.175
Number of Observations 860 860 850 812 773
Table 3
Changes in Firm Volatility Around Turnover by Turnover Type
Dependent variable: Ln(Event-Year Volatility /Year t-2 Volatility )
This table presents regressions of changes in firm volatility on the type of turnover and the change in market volatility over 
the same period.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of event-year volatility to base-year volatility, 
where the base year is defined as from 500 to 250 trading days prior to the turnover announcement.  Volatility is defined as 
the standard deviation of daily returns, and the CRSP value-weighted index is the market proxy.  Column one examines the 
event-year prior to the turnover (250 trading days prior to announcement), while columns two through five examine one 
through four event years after announcement, respectively.  Forced turnovers are defined as those turnovers for which the 
WSJ announcement indicates the CEO was forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not 
leave for health reasons or to go to another firm.  An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO where the new CEO 
has been with the firm for less than one year at the date of the announcement. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, and 
one, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  Standard errors are 
calculated using the White (1980) hetereoscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.
Panel A: By Turnover and Succession Type
Forced Voluntary t-statistic Outside Inside t-statistic
Departures Departures for difference Succession Succession for difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
%∆(Total Assets t-1,t+2) -5.21% 13.30% -4.65 *** -0.67% 14.12% -3.73 ***
%∆(Operating Income t-1,t+2) 1.50% 1.63% -0.19 1.45% 1.57% -0.16
%∆(Net Sales t-1,t+2) -4.69% 9.97% -3.65 *** 2.86% 10.18% -1.42
|Extraordinary Items t,t+1| / 2.62% 1.00% 1.75 * 1.61% 1.17% 1.29
     Total Assets t-1
Sales of PP&E t,t+1 / 2.83% 1.52% 2.03 ** 1.75% 1.66% 0.23
     Total Assets t-1
Panel B: By Turnover/Succession subsample
Inside vs. Forced vs.
Outside Voluntary
Departure type Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary Forced [Vol.] Outside [Inside]
Succession type Inside Inside Outside Outside (1) vs. (3) [(2) vs. (4)] (3) vs. (4) [(1) vs. (2)]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
%∆(Total Assets t-1,t+2) -6.93% 14.72% -3.70% 2.54% -0.46  [2.43**] -0.89   [-4.37***]
%∆(Operating Income t-1,t+2) 1.21% 1.66% 1.76% 1.39% -0.46     [0.28] 0.29       [-0.52]
%∆(Net Sales t-1,t+2) -3.24% 9.84% -6.02% 10.96% 0.39    [-0.14] -1.78*  [-2.72***]
|Extraordinary Items t,t+1| / 3.13% 0.98% 2.18% 1.11% 0.48    [-0.39] 1.81*       [1.13]
     Total Assets t-1
Sales of PP&E t,t+1 / 3.53% 1.48% 1.90% 1.84% 1.40    [-0.76] 0.07     [2.12**]
     Total Assets t-1
t-statistics
Table 4
Tests of Differences in Operations by Turnover and Succession Type
Departure Type Succession Type
This table presents an analysis of the changes in firm operations around CEO turnover as it relates to the type of turnover and the source of the 
successor CEO.  We present averages of changes in various operating variables around turnover for firms with forced departures (outside 
successions) versus firms with voluntary departures (inside successions).  Forced turnovers are defined as those turnovers for which the WSJ 
announcement indicates the CEO was forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was under the age of 60 and did not leave for health reasons or to go 
to another firm.  An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO where the new CEO has been with the firm for less than one year at the date 
of the announcement.  The table presents differences in the following variables across volatility-change subsamples: the percentage changes in total 
assets, operating income before depreciation, and net sales from the fiscal year prior to the turnover (t -1) to the fiscal year two years after the 
turnover (t +2), the absolute value of the sum of extraordinary items and the sum of cash flows from assets sales in years t  and t +1, both scaled by 
total assets in year t -1. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, and one, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.  Accounting variables are available for 703 of the 872 events.  Panel A details differences across forced and voluntary 
departures, and outside and inside successions.  Panel B details the differences across each possible pair of these two classifications.  Columns five 
and six of Panel B present t-statistics for means tests for departure type, holding succession type constant, and for succession type, holding 
departure type constant.
Volatility event period year t -1 year t+ 1 year t+2 year t+3 year t+4
Base period year t -2 year t -2 year t -2 year t -2 year t -2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.0008 0.0237 ** 0.0357 ** 0.0286 * 0.0240
(0.36) (2.20) (2.35) (1.75) (1.59)
Dummy=1 for Corresponding 0.0073 0.1706 *** 0.1411 ** 0.1065 ** 0.0213
     Forced Turnovers (0.53) (3.90) (2.31) (1.99) (0.31)
Dummy=1 for Corresponding 0.0000 0.0487 -0.0003 -0.0408 -0.0926
     Outside Succession (0.00) (1.31) (-0.01) (-0.82) (-1.46)
Ln(Ratio of Post- to Pre-Event 0.0070 0.1959 *** 0.2905 *** 0.2173 *** 0.3048 ***
     Market Volatility) (0.65) (5.89) (6.61) (4.81) (7.48)
Ln(Ratio of Post- to Pre-Event 0.9897 *** 0.5298 *** 0.3329 *** 0.2218 *** 0.2236 ***
     Matching Firm Volatility), (44.47) (10.12) (6.18) (5.33) (5.00)
     Matched on ∆(Pre-event Volatility)
Ln(Ratio of Post- to Pre-Event -0.0154 0.1322 ** 0.0359 0.0813 * 0.0461
     Matching Firm Volatility), (-1.64) (2.51) (0.79) (1.71) (1.08)
     Matched on Pre-event Return
Adjusted R2 0.950 0.485 0.250 0.175 0.227
Number of Observations 818 803 731 628 548
Dependent variable: Ln(Post-event Volatility /Pre-event Volatility )
Changes in Matching-Firm Volatility Around Event by Sample-Firm Turnover Type
Table 5
This table presents regressions of changes in firm volatility for the matching-sample  firms on the type of turnover for the corresponding 
sample  firm, and the change in market volatility over the same period.  For each turnover-sample firm, a matching firm is selected from 
the same size decile, with the closest return from two years before the announcement until announcement date.  The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of post-event-date volatility to pre-event-date volatility.  Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of daily returns, and the CRSP value-weighted index is the market proxy.  Column one uses the 250 trading days prior to the 
turnover (event year t -1), while columns two through five analyze event years t +1 through t +4, respectively.  Forced turnovers are 
defined as those turnovers for which the WSJ announcement indicates the CEO was forced out or fired, or for which the CEO was 
under the age of 60 and did not leave for health reasons or to go to another firm.  An outside succession is defined as a change in CEO 
where the new CEO has been with the firm for less than one year at the date of the announcement.  Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses using White (1980) robust standard errors.  t-Statistics are in parentheses, and one, two, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Forced Turnover Outside Succes- %∆(Total %∆(Operating %∆(Net Market Volatility
Dependent Variable Intercept Dummy sion Dummy Assets t-1,t+2) Income t-1,t+2) Sales t-1,t+2) Ratio
Ln(Year t+1 Volatility / 0.0425 *** 0.1565 *** 0.0588 -0.0923 * 0.3806 * -0.1037 * 0.5147 ***
     Year t-2 Volatility ) (3.01) (3.30) (1.38) (-1.96) (1.86) (-1.89) (16.30)
Ln(Year t+2 Volatility / 0.0461 *** 0.0868 * 0.0312 -0.1114 ** 0.3282 -0.0773 0.4669 ***
     Year t-2 Volatility ) (3.08) (1.74) (0.68) (-2.27) (1.49) (-1.52) (14.03)
Ln(Year t+3 Volatility / 0.0329 ** 0.0658 -0.0257 -0.0240 -0.2936 * 0.0164 0.3943 ***
     Year t-2 Volatility ) (2.41) (1.60) (-0.63) (-0.54) (-1.85) (0.42) (13.63)
Table 6
Tests for Changes in Volatility Controlling for Operating Variables
This table augments the regressions shown in columns (2) through (4) of Table 3 with operating variables.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of post-
turnover volatility to pre-turnover volatility.  Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily returns, and the CRSP value-weighted index is the market proxy.  The 
additional control variables are the percentage changes in total assets, operating income before depreciation, and net sales from the fiscal year prior to the turnover ( t -1) to the 
fiscal year two years after the turnover (t +2).  Other variables are as defined in Table 3. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses using White (1980) robust standard errors.  One, 
two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  Accounting variables are available for 703 of the 872 events.
